(A book review by John Burley, former senior official, United Nations)

Stanford University Press, 2024

A founding vision and its fractures

Contemporary reports of the birth of the United Nations in June 1945 in San Francisco welcomed news of its establishment and congratulated the United States for conceiving and delivering the new international organisation.  President Truman’s remarks at the signing ceremony: “What a great day this can be in history” were widely shared.  It was expected that, in contrast to the discredited League of Nations, the UN would keep the peace and promote international cooperation.

But now we know the seeds of the UN’s current difficulties were sown from the start.  The fact that the new organisation closely resembled the old was not the problem.  It was rather the tensions inherent in the Charter that would become ever more evident over the years: 

• the lofty words of the Preamble without effective enforcement measures;
• the rule of “non-interference in domestic affairs” inhibits the application of international standards;
• sovereign equality of all members co-existing with veto-wielding members decidedly more equal than the rest;
• the belief that the great power war-time unity could be maintained in the Security Council. 

The rules-based world order established after World War II is in grave difficulty. Wars and brutal tragedies in Gaza, Haiti, Lebanon, Myanmar, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen (amongst others) reflect its breakdown, a devastating judgement on the capacity of UN member states to live up to their commitments to maintain international peace and security as expressed in the Charter.

Are current difficulties more acute than those that have afflicted the UN in the past?  If so, are there measures that member states could be encouraged to take so as to render their organisation more effective in facing its current challenges?  Answers are provided in an important new book from two very experienced observers with profound knowledge of the workings of the Organisation.

Falk and von Sponeck call for the United Nations to be “liberated” from “geopolitical manipulation and short-sighted nationalism”.  Such “realism with hope” would free the Organisation to act with neutrality and objectivity solely in the interest of all member states.

The authors complement each other perfectly.  The one, a renowned academic, a vigorous proponent of the indispensability of international law and a courageous spokesman for those denied their rights.  The other, a former senior United Nations official with more than 30 years’ experience, saw at first hand in Iraq in the late 1990’s how it can be discredited and misused by some powerful member states and yet still retain a moral and ethical purpose.

The authors find successes in the UN’s policy-making and promotional roles, citing for example its advocacy of the right to development, its creation of norms such as the responsibility to protect, its law-making functions such as the Law of the Sea and its consensus on environmental challenges. The series of global summits on human rights, women, environmental and social issues were possible largely because the universality and legitimacy of the UN provide the necessary “convening power”. 

Geopolitical manipulation and its consequences

But the same has not happened as regards the UN’s primary function of maintaining peace and security.  The principal responsibility for this state of affairs lies in the hands of the permanent members of the Security Council, and especially the United States, for the manipulation of the UN for geo-political purposes.  From this, the UN needs liberating. 

President Truman was applauded when he said in San Francisco:

If any nation would keep security for itself, it must be ready … to share security with all. That is the price which each nation will have to pay for world peace. Unless we are all willing to pay that price no organization for world peace can accomplish its purpose.

Especially the United States, but also other P5 members, did not follow this wise advice.  The book presents three case studies demonstrating how powerful member states abused the Charter.  These are the long history of Israel/Palestine, when Falk was for a time the Special Rapporteur for the Human Rights Council, the humanitarian disaster in Iraq following the imposition of sanctions in the 1990’s, when von Sponeck was the Secretary-General’s Special Representative from late 1988-early 2000, and the more recent case of the use of chemical weapons in Douma, Syria, in the mid-2010’s.  The inability of the UN to maintain peace and security was heavily exposed in each of these crises, and the authors show how it was geopolitically manipulated and why.

It is uncomfortable reading.  Following the British abandonment of its mandate in 1947, the UN’s greatest failure has been its inability to find peace between Israel and Palestine that satisfies the interests and human rights of both parties.  But this has not been the fault of the Organisation as such: it was rather the United States which protected its ally Israel from recognising the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.  Likewise, the people of Iraq and their human rights suffered monstrously and without any good reason from the US- and UK-led sanctions.  And the case in Syria, as in Iraq, demonstrated clear breaches of integrity and objectivity from UN bodies and individuals. 

“The UN cannot be run by the US, but nor can the UN be run without the US” is one way of summarising the difficult relationship between the UN and the US.  And with US power now becoming less dominant in a multi-polar world, the relationship may become even more difficult.  Wars in Ukraine and in Gaza have exposed western double standards. The charge against the west from much of the rest of the world is that it has imposed the rules-based multilateral order with their own interests in mind.  

Three (France, UK and US) of the five (with China and Russia) veto-holding members are from the West, representing 31% of world GDP and 6% of world population. The veto was the price to pay for having the UN at all: neither the US, nor the then Soviet Union would have accepted otherwise. Understandably, the public at large regards the veto as rendering the UN useless. There is no justification for continuing an arrangement that is now obviously out of date.  But how can the veto be abolished when the veto powers themselves can prevent its abolition?  If the veto powers agreed to a “self-denying ordinance” on their use thereof, what could be the penalties for non-observance? 

Given both the current state of relations among the P5, and the difficulties inherent in the process itself, Falk and von Sponeck recognise, realistically, the “near impossibility” of any formal revision of the Charter that modifies the veto and/or permanent membership.  A long overdue increase in the size of the Security Council might be possible.  However necessary, this alone will not change the fundamental problem.

Pathways to reform and renewal

The authors emphasise that geopolitical manipulation of the Organisation could be offset by reforms that reflect how the state of international relations has evolved since 1945, given the development priorities of a post-colonial world with its concerns for human rights, climate change and biodiversity.  Changes in voting rules, funding and the autonomy of the Secretary-General would strengthen the political independence of the secretariat.  Reforms that ensure greater operational capacities of the UN would protect vulnerable people, especially migrants and victims of war and repression.  Their suggestions are politically feasible and appeal to different parts of the UN’s constituencies. 

It was originally envisaged that the General Assembly would not address peace and security issues in deference to the Security Council.  However, at the time of the Korean war in 1950, members adopted a “Uniting for Peace” resolution whereby the General Assembly may call an emergency session if the Security Council fails to act. Several such emergency sessions have been held since.  The 2022 Liechtenstein initiative obligates the General Assembly to meet within 10 days of a veto in the Security Council. 

The growing involvement of the General Assembly in peace and security issues is a practical example of how the United Nations could function in the event of non-action by the Security Council.  This expansive interpretation of the Charter is reminiscent of Dag Hammarskjöld’s initiatives when he put in place the first UN peace-keeping operations in Suez in 1956 and the Congo in 1960, operations not mentioned in the Charter.  Hammarskjöld used to say that any such action was permissible as long as it was consistent with, and not prohibited by, the Charter.  What is required is political savvy, courage and imagination, qualities which are not unknown to humankind.

Security Council resolutions vary greatly in whether or not the resolution itself sets out agreed methods for its implementation.  When it doesn’t, it often means there is no such agreement among the members of the Council, in other words a dead letter, ignored by all concerned.  Enforcement measures in resolutions should become the norm.

The authors also urge more use of the normative architecture and advocacy functions of international law.  They highlight the distinction between legality (of a Security Council resolution) and legitimacy (arising from the moral force of near-consensus decisions in the General Assembly or the Human Rights Council).  Independent judicial tribunals are common at the national level, but there is no international equivalent.  Here, the authors argue for greater use of the practice of Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice, through more frequent recourse to requesting opinions, allowing bodies other than the Security Council or the General Assembly (e.g. the Secretary-General) to request opinions and, especially, rendering the Opinion obligatory rather than advisory.  At the moment, those adversely affected by an Opinion can ignore the finding. 

Three distinct set of issues need reform in the financing of the United Nations.  First, late or non-payment of the regular assessed contribution is scandalous.  Late payers should be penalised.  Second, ear-marked contributions from donors for pet items of interest to them distort membership-wide priorities. The practice should be severely limited. Third, direct financing through international taxation would significantly facilitate operations.  But very difficult: the power of the purse enables major powers to maintain control.  

The authors explain how multilateralism benefits from greater involvement of civil society, for example, from the analysis and solutions regarding climate change to humanitarian and development operations.  There is an excellent “What if” section that demonstrates the impact of the UN’s work when all necessary conditions (especially political will and resources) are in place. Comments from young representatives from around the world on the need for effective multilateralism and fascinating end-pieces from Dr Walden Bello and Ahmet Davutoglu complete an excellent survey.  

The book omits recognition that the current make-or-break point for the UN requires heads of government to become directly involved in findings ways out of the current imbroglio. Otherwise, Falk and von Sponeck have many hopeful recommendations that would liberate the UN from its many tribulations.