A system under strain—and in demand

At a moment when the international system appears increasingly fragile, one paradox stands out: multilateral cooperation is both weakening and more necessary than ever. As geopolitical tensions rise, conflicts multiply, and global challenges—from climate change to financial instability—intensify, cooperation among states remains the only viable alternative to disorder. Yet the institutions designed to facilitate such cooperation are under growing strain.

Today’s multilateral system faces pressures on multiple fronts. Politically, consensus among major powers has eroded. Functionally, international organizations often struggle to deliver effective outcomes. Financially, many institutions are underfunded. And perhaps most troubling, public confidence in multilateralism has declined in many parts of the world. The language of “crisis” has become ubiquitous.

But describing the current moment simply as a crisis risks obscuring a more complex reality. To understand what is happening, it is useful to place the present within a longer historical perspective.

Multilateralism as an evolving system

Multilateralism has never been static. It emerged in the nineteenth century as a diplomatic practice among European powers and gradually evolved into a more formalized system of institutions. The twentieth century saw the creation of international administrative bodies, the League of Nations, and eventually the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions. After 1945, multilateralism became an institutionalized framework for organizing international order, combining universal norms formally applicable to all states with enduring political hierarchies in practice.

Since the end of the Cold War, this system has expanded and diversified. Membership has grown, institutions have multiplied, and new forms of cooperation have emerged, including partnerships with non-state actors. Seen in this light, the current turbulence is not entirely unprecedented. Multilateralism has always evolved through cycles of contestation, adaptation, and renewal.

Crisis or transformation?

One way to interpret the present moment is to see it not as a breakdown, but as part of this longer process of transformation. Historically, periods of stress have often produced institutional innovation rather than collapse. The League of Nations, despite its well-known failures, evolved significantly during the interwar period and laid important groundwork for the post-1945 system. The United Nations itself has faced criticism throughout much of its history, particularly during the Cold War. Current institutional blockages, therefore, do not necessarily signal impending collapse, but may instead reflect a period of redefinition.

Another perspective emphasizes shifts in global power. A longstanding argument in international relations is that periods of strong multilateral cooperation tend to coincide with relatively stable configurations of power, often supported by a dominant actor willing to bear the costs of sustaining the system. The liberal postwar order, underpinned by U.S. leadership, is a clear example. Today, however, that order is increasingly contested, both internally and externally. The relative decline of U.S. influence, combined with the rise of other powers—most notably China—has produced a more contested and multipolar environment. In such a context, coordination becomes more difficult and institutions more fragile.

A third interpretation points to a deeper structural tension within multilateralism itself: the gap between its universal aspirations and its hierarchical realities. The principle of sovereign equality coexists uneasily with privileges granted to certain states, most visibly in the United Nations Security Council. This tension is not new; it has existed since the earliest forms of multilateral cooperation. What we are witnessing today may therefore be less a departure from the norm than a renewed manifestation of this longstanding contradiction.

A more plural world

From another vantage point, what is often described in Western discourse as a crisis of multilateralism can also be understood as a belated challenge to an international order historically dominated by a relatively small group of Western powers. For many countries in the Global South, the issue is not simply institutional dysfunction, but the persistence of unequal representation and influence. Moreover, these critiques are themselves not new. Debates over inequality in the international system, including calls for a New International Economic Order in the 1970s, reflected similar concerns about the distribution of power and voice within global governance.

This broader historical perspective suggests that the current moment is not only about competing diagnoses of crisis, but also about competing visions of reform and alternative futures. The proliferation of new forums, regional arrangements, and alternative coalitions reflects a more plural and decentralized international system. While this fragmentation can complicate coordination, it also creates space for new actors, perspectives, and institutional experiments.

At the same time, competing narratives about the nature of the crisis shape how it is understood and addressed. Comparisons to the 1930s, for example, are frequently invoked to highlight the dangers of institutional weakness and geopolitical rivalry. Such analogies are powerful—but they can also oversimplify historical realities.

Lessons from the 1930s

The collapse of the League of Nations is often treated as a cautionary tale about the failure of multilateralism. Yet this interpretation overlooks an important historical nuance. While collective security mechanisms faltered during the 1930s, other forms of international cooperation persisted—and in some cases even intensified.

A revealing example is the interwar role of organizations such as the International Labour Organization, which continued to function as hubs of expertise and coordination, addressing issues such as unemployment and labor standards during the Great Depression. Even during the Second World War, efforts to design the postwar international order were already underway. The United Nations did not emerge suddenly in 1945, but rather as the culmination of years of reflection, negotiation, and institutional experimentation.

This history points to an important distinction between different forms of multilateralism. Collective security arrangements, closely tied to power politics, are particularly vulnerable during periods of geopolitical confrontation. By contrast, more functional forms of cooperation—in areas such as health, trade, finance, or the environment—have often proved more resilient. They are rooted in practical needs and supported by networks of expertise that can endure even in periods of intense political conflict.

Reconfiguring multilateralism

What, then, does this broader historical perspective imply for today?

First, major crises do not necessarily signal the end of multilateralism. More often, they reshape its forms and priorities. Second, multilateralism is not a single, unified system; its different components evolve unevenly, with some weakening while others persist or even strengthen. Third, periods of disruption can create opportunities for institutional innovation.

Seen through this lens, the current moment appears less as a collapse than as a reconfiguration. New forms of multilateralism—often more flexible, informal, or issue-specific—are emerging alongside established institutions. At the same time, longstanding bodies such as the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund face growing scrutiny over their legitimacy and effectiveness.

The challenge, therefore, is not simply to defend multilateralism in its existing form, but to rethink and renew it. This requires addressing both structural imbalances and functional shortcomings. It also requires a clearer understanding of where cooperation is most likely to succeed.

In a more contested, conflict-riven, and potentially multipolar world, the future of multilateralism is likely to evolve along multiple paths. The question is therefore not whether multilateralism as such will survive, but what forms it will take—and whether those forms will be capable of meeting the demands of an increasingly complex and interconnected world.

From diagnosis to renewal

I would like to conclude by posing several questions.

First, if multilateralism has always experienced periods of crisis, how can we distinguish between recurring tensions and moments of deeper structural transformation?

Second, if multilateral cooperation has historically depended on particular configurations of power, what conditions would make effective multilateralism possible in a more genuinely post-hegemonic world?

Third, if some forms of cooperation prove more resilient than others during periods of geopolitical tension, in which issue areas—and through what kinds of institutional arrangements—should reform efforts now be concentrated?

Finally, is it still meaningful to think of multilateralism as a single universal framework, or should we instead understand it as a more plural and differentiated set of overlapping, and at times competing, practices? 

These questions are not merely academic. How they are answered will shape the future capacity of the international community to respond to shared global challenges in an increasingly fragmented world. The task ahead is therefore not simply to preserve multilateralism, but to rethink how international cooperation can remain effective, legitimate, and adaptable under profoundly changing global conditions.