A functional, reliable system for international arms control/weapons governance has been a persistent global governance deficit and goal at least since the First Hague Peace Conference, convened by Russian Czar Nicolas II in 1899. Both the Covenant of the League of Nations and the UN Charter contain provisions on systemic international arms control. Under the 1945 Charter, the Security Council, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee, was mandated with the formulation of plans for “the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments” (Art. 26). Such plans were never developed.
The current fragmented and ad hoc international arms control approach has come under great stress in recent years – demonstrating its fragility – as bilateral and plurilateral agreements or treaties unravel. The reliance on moral norms of prudent restraint and the strategy of deterrence remain a weak defense against global weapon catastrophes and irresponsible behavior by nuclear weapon states and other actors. Recent developments in chemical and biological weapons, cyberwarfare, and lethal autonomous weapons, as well as advancements in synthetic biology, genetic engineering, and artificial intelligence, are also accelerating new international weapons-related risks.
In parallel, and on the positive side, advances in arms control and disarmament knowledge and techniques, monitoring and verification capabilities (including new technology and data systems), and the increased number of weapons control regime models (which are recognized to improve “hard security” outcomes), all favor renewed contemporary efforts at more systemic global arms control approaches.
This expert Working Group will review recent developments and seek to produce guiding principles and an elaborated strategy around a possible new, refreshed approach to systemic, consolidated, and reliable international weapons governance.
