

# 18 Finessing R2P, an International Peace Force to Protect Heritage and Humans

*Thomas G. Weiss*

The work of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) is a remarkable human rights achievement, despite the contested application and non-application of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm—e.g., in Libya but not in Syria, Myanmar, and Ukraine (ICISS 2001; Weiss and Hubert 2001). In the interest of truth in packaging, this author was the ICISS research director (Weiss 2016). The ethical, political, legal, and operational foundations of this evolving norm provide a policy wedge for consideration, the specific task of protecting cultural heritage by an international peace force. Such a task for such a force could provide a building block for an international military capacity that could, if successful, be reinforced over time to help implement R2P to a greater degree and to higher legal and ethical standards than has been the case to date.

The politics that lead to substantial and contested differences in interpretation about when and where to intervene in specific crises to protect people do *not* characterise the destruction of cultural heritage by such non-state thugs as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS or by its Arabic acronym Da'esh) or such pariah states as the Taliban's Afghanistan, as well as such major and middle powers as China and Iran in their respective attempts to eliminate Uyghur heritage and what little traces remain of the Baha'i community. Such rogue actors are immediate targets for widespread, if not quite universal external opprobrium.

Hence, it could be politically advantageous to authorise interventions to protect heritage, arguably an easier political task than agreeing on measures to protect people. At the same time, such interventions would also protect individuals whose culture invariably and simultaneously is under siege.

Why does this recommendation make sense? First, because an international peace force could begin with this difficult but more plausible task, a response to the plea from the editors 'to make the intellectual effort to overcome the blockage of diminished expectations for global governance, and to map possible ways forward' (Lopez-Claros, Dahl and Groff 2020: xi). Second, this specific and manageable task could perhaps overcome the routine rejection of the feasibility of an independent peace force (or rapid reaction capability for quick-breaking disasters); although it has resurfaced regularly, this idea has been summarily dismissed as implausible since Trygve Lie's original 1948 proposal (Roberts 2008).

This chapter's first section briefly discusses the salience of the present moment before the relevance of R2P for the protection of cultural heritage. The third section continues with the value of inserting politics into what, for over a century, has been largely a legal conversation. The fourth section explores the possible 'force multiplier' from the use of

heritage protection as a more routine part of the peaceful resolution of disputes and of the mandates for outside military forces, more particularly still of an independent peace force.

### **Contemporary Heritage Destruction and Political Momentum**

The destruction of cultural heritage amidst violence and atrocities is not new. Hitler's storm troopers, Mao's cultural revolutionaries, Soviet pogroms, and Pol Pot's killing fields provided some of the 20th century's most infamous images until the post-Cold War era resulted in not only death and displacement but cultural wastelands as well.

Russia's illegal war of choice in Ukraine is the most recent illustration. It has produced thousands of deaths and an unprecedented crisis of forced displacement of a quarter of its prewar population (some six million refugees and about the same number of internally displaced). Along with indiscriminate attacks on civilians, schools and hospitals, there is ample evidence to justify an investigation by the International Criminal Court (ICC) of Vladimir Putin's war crimes. Following requests from 43 member states, the ICC's Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan announced in March 2022 that he would investigate possible war crimes committed in Ukraine (including the crimes of aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide).

The evidence has increased dramatically since then, and in March 2023, the ICC issued arrest warrants for Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, his Commissioner for Children's Rights. The charges are their alleged responsibility for the war crime of unlawful deportation of a population (children) and that of unlawful transfer of a population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation.

In addition to the hideous human tragedy—including the deliberate targeting of day-care centres, schools and hospital—was the ongoing threat to Ukraine's rich cultural legacy. Among other atrocities are Russian forces' destroying Ukrainian cultural heritage. For instance, they deliberately burned to the ground the Ivankiv Museum north of Kyiv, which housed precious Ukrainian folk art, in what local scholars called 'an unfolding cultural catastrophe' (quoted in Cuno 2022).

The irony of what is still labelled a 'special military operation' to liberate Ukraine from 'Nazis' was absent from Russian propaganda as they fired on and damaged the Holocaust Memorial in Drobitsky Yar on the outskirts of Kharkiv and the memorial park of the Holocaust memorial Babyn Yar. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky tweeted: 'What is the point of saying "never again" for 80 years, if the world stays silent when a bomb drops on the same site?' (quoted in Khurshudyan, Lee and Berger 2022). The United Nations Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (UNESCO) has compiled a seemingly ever-growing list that as of May 1, 2023, counted 255 sites that had been damaged or destroyed since Moscow's invasion began on February 24, 2022. It included 110 religious sites, 91 buildings of historical or artistic interest, 19 monuments, 18 museums, and 12 libraries (UNESCO 2023). The most severe humanitarian and refugee crisis in Europe since World War II and systematic destruction of Ukrainian cultural heritage have also witnessed what many experts say is the largest collective theft of artefacts since the Nazi plunder.

The year 2021 had two dramatic illustrations of the fraught relationship between targeting heritage and people. The messy U.S. withdrawal in August after the two-decade war in Afghanistan ushered in the return of the Taliban, a group responsible for arguably one of the most visible and infamous destructions of cultural heritage, the March 2001

demolition of the Bamiyan Buddhas. This Sunni Islamicist political movement's effective propaganda noted that international actors, particularly Western powers, cared more about the statues than desperate Afghans. The regime sought to conceal the human catastrophe in its accompanying campaign of atrocities against the Hazara ethnic minority. While not Buddhists, the Hazara respected the mammoth sculptures and lived in the valley where the Buddhas had dominated for 15 centuries. The Hazara were considered heretics by the Sunni Taliban; as Shi'ite Muslims, their crime was not idolatry but more crucially being members of the armed opposition.

In addition to the repression of basic rights, especially of women and girls, the Taliban's return was accompanied by the perilous potential for additional destruction of cultural heritage. Protecting the people of Afghanistan is paramount but so too is safeguarding their extraordinary cultural legacy. It is not hard to imagine a future fatwa that targets pre-Islamic statues and sanctuaries along with 'heretics' of all stripes.

While there was no heritage destruction, a telling illustration of the intimate links between crimes against people and culture occurred a few months earlier. In May 2021, Israeli police cut the speaker wires in the Al-Aqsa Mosque, thereby preventing the call to prayer and making more audible the Israeli President's competing address on Memorial Day. Al-Aqsa was another provocation that disregarded a community's cultural heritage at the beginning of Ramadan. Widespread violence, suffering and war crimes followed—on both sides but more numerous by the more powerful Israeli state—along with civil strife and mob attacks in mixed Palestinian-Jewish cities across Israel and the occupied West Bank.

A bit of good news surfaces amidst this gloom. Contemporary politics presents an opportunity to address the ancient tactic of attacking cultural heritage. The destruction of such visible sites as the Bamiyan Buddhas, as well as the Mostar Bridge, Palmyra, Sana'a, and Timbuktu, received a 'boost', if that is the term, with the worldwide outrage that greeted Donald Trump's threats against 52 Iranian cultural sites in January 2020, after Teheran menaced retaliation for the assassination of Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani. While he later retracted the menace—following pressure from, among others, the Departments of Defense and of State—Trump's initial statement drew attention to the role of cultural heritage in times of political and military turmoil. 'They're allowed to kill our people', Trump said. 'And we're not allowed to touch their cultural site? It doesn't work that way' (quoted in Haberman 2020).

Protecting heritage has become more prominent on the international public policy agenda. It is no longer a 'niche topic', the exclusive domain of cultural specialists. If further indications were necessary, the failure to protect adequately Iraqi cultural heritage during the initial U.S. occupation suggested the need to broaden perspectives and participation (Global Policy Forum 2007). Individuals caught in the crosshairs of violence and menaced by mass atrocities invariably encounter conscious cultural heritage destruction. Indeed, for those who analyse politics and design responses, including military ones, it is noteworthy that insiders at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) underline the links between security and cultural heritage (Finkelstein, Gilman and Rosén 2022).

Could it be politically advantageous to intervene and protect heritage, which would protect the people whose culture is under siege? That question was the starting point for a J. Paul Getty Trust research project that explored normative developments for the protection of cultural heritage in a 2022 volume that James Cuno and I edited, entitled *Cultural Heritage and Mass Atrocities*. 'Yes' is the guardedly optimistic response from those pages (Cuno and Weiss 2022; Weiss 2022, 2023).

It is essential to underline that international action should embrace UNESCO's highly visible World Heritage sites *and* everyday tangible heritage—Uyghur mud-brick temples in China, Christian village cemeteries in Iraq, neighbourhood Rohingya mosques in Myanmar, and Tatar traces in occupied Crimea. Ordinary sites also have become a daily bill of fare of destruction. And they, too, are integral to attacking the people whose heritage they represent as part of efforts to annihilate histories along with human beings.

### **The R2P and Beyond**

What can be done to counter the immoral, illegal and wanton attacks on heritage? Progress is possible on the normative and policy fronts to attenuate the deliberate destruction of culture for culture's sake, what former UNESCO Director-General Irina Bokova called 'cultural cleansing'.<sup>1</sup>

While some observers see competition between a concern with bricks and with blood, the two are intertwined—indeed, inseparable. While analysts parse atrocities versus heritage, most publics easily link the images of heritage destruction to mass murder, forced displacement, rape, ethnic cleansing, sterilisation, human trafficking, slavery, and terrorism. They always take place in tandem. Is it possible to demonstrate unequivocally that the fate of vulnerable populations is as important as their cultures? Robert Bevan (2022: 332) replies, 'Incorporating cultural destruction in the definition of genocide is essential to making this happen'.

While many governments and citizens loudly deplore such devastation, they do little about it; indeed, they see little that they can do. Yet, collective steps are not only desirable but also plausible, part of what a future-oriented look at the United Nations recommended as a 'shift from defending and preserving multilateralism to strengthening and renewing it' (Bokova 2014). It is worth recalling that analogous reactions—glum resignation and throwing up diplomatic hands in despair accompanied by the gnashing of humanitarian teeth—once characterised the fledgling initial efforts to conceptualise action against those who murdered and abused civilians in the 1990s. That listlessness lasted until humanitarian interventions were followed by the 2001 ICISS report. That encouraging ideational and political process (Weiss 2013, 2016) and the subsequent normative itinerary have been thoroughly analysed (Bellamy 2009; Evans 2008; Hehir 2012; Orford 2011; Thakur 2017).

It is easy to overlook the pace of the breathtaking journey. The calculation by one of the ICISS co-chairs, Gareth Evans, remains accurate because the period since the publication represents 'a blink of the eye in the history of ideas' (Evans 2008: 28). Edward Luck, the first special adviser to the UN Secretary-General on R2P, recalled that the lifespan of successful norms is 'measured in centuries, not decades' (Luck 2011: 387). R2P has continued to advance from the passionate prose of an eminent group towards being a mainstay of international public policy debates, even if international actions remain painfully rare, tentative and inconsistent. The norm is embedded in the values of international society and occasionally in specific policies and responses to mass atrocities. Linking the protection of people and their heritage, one analyst working at the interface, Hugh Eakin (2015), noted, 'While the United Nations has adopted the "responsibility to protect" [R2P] doctrine, to allow for international intervention to stop imminent crimes of war or genocide, no such parallel principle has been introduced for cultural heritage'. Yet, we do not require another principle because of the intimate link between protecting heritage and protecting vulnerable populations. Attacks on culture invariably accompany

genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing—the mass atrocities that the 2005 World Summit agreed should trigger an R2P response (United Nations 2005: paras. 138–140).

There are two reasons behind R2P's analytical, ethical and operational pertinence for cultural heritage. The first is the logic of ICISS's original three-part framework, which differs from former secretary-general Ban Ki-Moon's formulation of three pillars that now structure most UN deliberations (Ban Ki-Moon 2009). While his pillars are an easier political sell, the original three responsibilities of ICISS provide a more logical starting point to fashion a workable framework for protecting tangible cultural heritage amidst mass atrocities. Cultural specialists apply the same three concepts—to prevent, to react and to rebuild—in their approach to the protection of cultural heritage and its custodians. There is an imperative to prevent destruction, but when that fails, it is necessary to react; when both of those fail, as is too often the case, it is essential to rebuild. The second reason is that the major constraint facing robust international action to protect heritage usually is the same as efforts to safeguard vulnerable civilians: sacrosanct state sovereignty.

Normative advances do not guarantee action, but they are essential steps to move beyond ad hoc, inconsistent, local, and short-term responses towards more systematic, predictable, global, rules-based, and coordinated actions. R2P's normative journey is pertinent because it reflected and exploited an altered political reality: it was no longer taboo to discuss how best to halt mass atrocities. Despite the Westphalian origins of the UN Charter and protests to the contrary, state sovereignty was no longer viewed as sacrosanct but conditional on a modicum of respect for life. Although when and where to invoke R2P remain contested, virtually no commentators suggest that it is completely flawed for organising global conversations and responses to mass atrocities. Instead, discourse now is less about *whether* and more about *how*.

However, robust action does not necessarily follow—any more than it does for all challenges to world order—but the language and logic are now different. R2P occupies a prominent spot in mainstream policy debates. In May 2023, the Security Council invoked it in 90 resolutions and 14 Presidential Statements, and the Human Rights Council in 74 resolutions. The United Nations General Assembly's consideration of R2P in May 2021 was indicative: 115 for and 15 against (28 abstentions).<sup>2</sup> The normative shift is clear even if implementation is disputed, as, for example, regime change in Libya.

How best to come to the rescue of immovable cultural heritage amidst mass atrocities is at the beginning of a comparable normative itinerary. It could elicit enhanced international attention, growing consensus and more vigorous policies in a changing political landscape; perhaps action could occasionally follow as well. Similarities exist between today's political environment for protecting tangible cultural heritage and the 1990s, when states were searching for a rationale after doing too little too late in Rwanda and, some said, too much too soon in Kosovo. In short, destruction of immovable cultural heritage amidst state and non-state atrocities is not new, but today's better-informed politics may be propitious to facilitate additional normative and policy advances.

The link is intimate between protecting people and their cultures, whether one stresses the intrinsic or extrinsic value of tangible cultural heritage. Cosmopolitans emphasise the former as humanity benefits from all specific manifestations of culture and suffers from their disappearance. Humanitarians emphasise the extrinsic value because those who commit mass atrocities are aware that the annihilation of heritage is a prelude to, or an integral part of, targeting people.

There is no need to split intrinsic and extrinsic hairs. To repeat, the protection of people and of culture are inseparable. Moreover, there is no need for any hierarchy of protection because the choice between bricks and blood is false, as is the choice between people and the natural environment—breathable air, drinkable water and culture are essential for life.

It is useful to recall that the responsibility to react includes sanctions, international criminal pursuit and military intervention. Fewer intrusive options should be pursued before more intrusive ones. Hence, military force should be deployed in rare cases of profound humanitarian distress and, by extension, widespread attacks on immovable cultural heritage—for itself and as a precursor for the mass atrocities that undoubtedly follow. As mentioned, the World Summit's *Outcome Document* specifically enumerated four triggers: 'genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity'. As for just war theory, precautionary R2P principles (right intention, last resort, proportional means, and reasonable prospects) should also govern international measures in response to the destruction of cultural heritage.

R2P has the potential to evolve further in customary international law and to contribute to ongoing conversations about the characteristics of legitimate or rogue sovereigns. Compliance, as always, is another story. Yet, norms are where we start. Politics, not the law, got us this far. And it could get us further still.

### **The Dearth of Political Will, Not Law**

Politics provides a clearer lens than the law through which to view a path towards improved policy measures, especially for arenas like cultural heritage where public international law is well developed. Bokova's 'cultural cleansing' resonates because, like 'ethnic cleansing', it is not a legal construct but has political traction. Like former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart's definition of pornography, we know cultural and ethnic cleansing when we see them, even if some lawyers wrangle about the absence of specific criteria and hard law.

That said, it is helpful to keep in mind the conventions deposited at UNESCO, which have garnered a large number of state signatories: the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict; the 1970 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property; and the 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (UNESCO 1972). Their common feature is the 'value' or 'importance' of heritage as the criterion to determine the status as cultural 'property' or 'heritage'. A growing preference, certainly mine, is for the latter because it stresses stewardship and trusteeship not the accidents of current deeds or contemporary national borders. The 1972 definition outlines the 'outstanding universal value' of an artefact or site that elevates it to protected status; the 1954 definition implies the same by pointing to 'the cultural heritage of every people'. The shared human value of immovable and movable cultural heritage in these two conventions is not limited to those who have inherited it directly or indirectly. They both stand in stark contrast with the state-centric 1970 one that makes 'cultural property' contingent upon that designation by a state; that label stresses ownership, not stewardship.

This body of heritage law should be viewed side-by-side with the substantial body of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law. All remain essential elements of international society, of course, but a broader, deeper and more adequate policy agenda should embrace other disciplines and orientations.

It is worth examining the politics behind the decision *not* to include the protection of heritage in what many would consider the hardest of international laws: the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Although dismissed as academic toys, counterfactuals can focus the mind (Tetlock and Belkin 1996). What if Raphael Lemkin's vandalism had not been excluded from the 1948 Genocide Convention? Would the prospects for cultural heritage have fared better in ongoing tragedies in Syria, Yemen, Myanmar, Ukraine, and Xinxiang, as well as earlier ones in Afghanistan, Iraq, Sri Lanka, the Balkans, and Mali?

Scholars have paid fleeting attention to Lemkin's (1933, 1944) early work about the relevance of cultural *and* biological genocide. His 1933 submission to a League of Nations gathering stressed 'vandalism', as well as 'barbarity' (1933, 1944: xiii).<sup>3</sup> However, the negotiators of the 1948 convention dropped cultural genocide. Ironically, as Luck pointed out, the politics at that time were a reverse geographical image of the contemporary reluctance about R2P in parts of the Global South versus its embrace in the North (Luck 2018: 23–27). The original opposition to 'vandalism' in the convention came from colonial powers (Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) and settler countries (the United States, Canada, Brazil, Australia, and New Zealand). They feared condemnation and perhaps calls for reparations because of their crimes against indigenous populations. The debate resembled that concerning the possible inclusion of a Bill of Rights in the UN Charter, which was initially resisted by many of the same states whose governments worried about legal redress from disadvantaged minorities. It is ironic that, at the time, more enthusiasm for the inclusion of cultural genocide than for a Charter Bill of Rights came from independent developing countries and colonies about to become independent.

In an ironic twist of geopolitical fate, many countries are now among those that label R2P an unwarranted intrusion into their domestic affairs—at worst, a Trojan Horse for Western imperialism. The abuse of this norm, like all norms, is subject to self-interested manipulation and justification by diplomats and politicians. That reality is not new, but new counterfactual questions highlight an altered political reality: What if the 1948 debate had occurred in the post-Cold War era and after decolonisation? Would the politics have been different? Would the Global South have championed cultural and physical genocide in collaboration with industrialised countries?

In any case, governmental delegates in the 1948 negotiations agreed only to include physical genocide in the convention and eliminated cultural and social aspects from earlier drafts. Lemkin's experience during World War II led him to link both physical and cultural destruction—murdering people and their histories are two sides of the same coin. Ukraine provides the most recent evidence.

So, advocates for human rights and R2P should elevate, not downgrade, the destruction of cultural heritage because it reliably foreshadows mass atrocities and invariably accompanies them. We need to understand the range of conscience-shocking perpetrators, crimes and incentives characterising the connections between attacks on cultural heritage and on people. Attackers include such iconoclasts as ISIS on Palmyra, Islamists on the mausoleums and tombs of Sufi saints in Timbuktu, and terrorists on churches on Easter Sunday in Colombo. Alternatively, destruction may result from targeted military attacks by recognised governments: Russian bombardments of the Umayyad Great Mosque of Aleppo, Saudi jets of Sana'a, Taliban dynamite of the Bamiyan Valley, and Chinese desecration of Uyghur shrines.

Another reason to focus on politics is that public international law, here as elsewhere, does not impede action. Rather, it is the absence of political will to enforce the law. Gary

Bass, in his history of humanitarian intervention, provides an apt summary for this discussion as well: ‘We are all atrocitarians now—but so far only in words, and not yet in deeds’ (Bass 2008: 382). The lack of enforcement across every operational issue, even those with the most developed legal infrastructure like this one, is the largest deficit in global governance (Weiss and Thakur 2010); its absence renders tangible cultural heritage especially vulnerable.

It is worth noting that none of the ten distinguished international lawyers in our collection suggested refining cultural heritage law.<sup>4</sup> Instead, a topic that has been dominated for over a century by the pursuit of better public international law should make room for the more pragmatic and strategic tasks of (1) strengthening the emerging R2P norm that includes the protection of cultural heritage and (2) mobilising the political will to act in a timely fashion to implement existing laws and enhance compliance.

There are political mobilisation tasks linked to existing law. An immediate priority is to encourage the over 60 reticent or hostile member states—there are currently 133 states parties—to ratify the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and Its First Protocol. The absence of three permanent members of the Security Council (China, Russia and the United States) is a particular weakness regarding the Second Protocol, which has only 84 states parties. This protocol strives to limit the broad interpretation of ‘imperative military necessity’ and expands the convention’s scope to cover civil wars and non-state parties. Its ratification is essential for dealing with contemporary armed conflicts.

Political pressure is also required to build on the precedent of the *Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al-Mahdi*, the ICC’s first sentence for the war crime of attacking cultural heritage, viz., the wanton destruction in Timbuktu. An essential diplomatic priority is getting the holdouts, especially the same three permanent members of the Security Council, to ratify the Rome Statute. Appropriately for our purposes, its Preamble states that ‘all peoples are united by common bonds, their cultures pieced together in a shared heritage’. Mali’s ratification of the ICC Statute was a prerequisite for the extradition, trial and conviction of al-Mahdi for this precedent-setting decision.

Finally, a word is in order about transitional justice, which is a related but not strictly judicial action that has been pioneered in peacebuilding following atrocities and mass violations of human rights. Could it also fruitfully be applied to the prevention of and reaction to cultural heritage destruction (Sands and Rais 2022)? Developed for post-conflict peacebuilding, the adaptation of transitional justice would not stress the letter of international heritage law but rather would provide practical solutions for communities that have suffered both heritage loss and mass atrocities. This tool opens space through the public airing and admission of past crimes but is not necessarily accompanied by punishments. Some 50 truth commissions have been used over the last four decades to address atrocities in countries as varied as Argentina, South Africa, Guatemala, Liberia, and Cambodia.

Truth commissions can go beyond current crises. For example, in 2021, France decided to organise a Commission ‘Mémoires et Vérité’ [Memories and Truth Commission] regarding the country’s role in the Algerian Civil War that had ended almost six decades earlier. Recent German and Belgian governmental commissions have documented colonial atrocities. The goal of cultural heritage commissions and transitional justice would be to not ignore cultural cleansing while simultaneously not exacerbating the fragile equilibrium of countries in transition. Such commissions would aim at a reckoning, which could help societies emerging from traumatic periods not only to confront their past and interrupt cycles of atrocities but hopefully also to turn the page on the conflict.



At the outset, I argued that the present political moment could be considered propitious. The destruction of cultural heritage has captured the attention not just of curators, archaeologists, historians, and activists but also of major media outlets and popular audiences. Cultural specialists always sound a clarion call when heritage is at risk, but there is now a wider recognition of the significance of contemporary damage. For instance, in 2022, specially trained experts became part of the U.S. Army Reserve to save artefacts in war zones, a version 2.0 of Monuments Men and Women (Stevens 2022). The Buddhas of Bamiyan were among the first cases to draw widespread attention, and media attention has continued with coverage of Al-Qaeda and ISIL attacks. Damage to Ukraine's cultural heritage became a feature of the wide condemnation of Moscow's onslaught against a people and their culture.

Further, the destruction of cultural heritage has become strongly associated in the public's mind and in government policy with widely reviled terrorist groups; protection of cultural heritage thus benefits from an association with the high politics of international security. Given the emotive power and political traction of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the destruction of remote antiquities has drawn the ire of groups ranging from UN member states to domestic political actors, from nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) to individuals. Governments often frame the destruction of tangible heritage by terrorists as another front in the GWOT, and they interpret intervention on behalf of culture as one way to hamper financing. Hence, even hard-pressed fiscal authorities are amenable to dedicating resources to protecting cultural heritage.

This confluence of visibility and political salience provides the backdrop to generalise about possible concrete steps to prevent such damage, especially with its direct link to humanitarianism. Since the UN Security Council's 2017 resolution 2347, attacks on cultural heritage qualify as 'a threat to international peace and security', the trigger for council decisions. This shift resembles the expansion of the justification for the protection of war victims in the 1990s. At the outset of that decade, diplomats viewed humanitarian interventions in northern Iraq and Somalia as exceptional. Resolutions to protect Kurds followed the first UN enforcement action since Korea, and the resolution approving the Somalia intervention mentioned the word 'humanitarian' 18 times to suggest that no precedent was being set. Indeed, the 1995 report by the Commission on Global Governance proposed that humanitarian emergencies be the subject of a Charter amendment to permit Security Council action (Commission on Global Governance 1995: 90). When their report was available, that recommendation was moot, as the council had already so decided and acted in several additional disasters without any need for a Charter amendment. The Security Council defines actionable threats to international peace and security.

In brief, there are adequate international legal tools to protect immovable cultural heritage should UN member states so decide; there also is evidence that political will can be mobilised. That, of course, is not easy but requires addressing, among others, thorny military issues that cannot be finessed.

### **Protecting Heritage: A Force Multiplier for Outside Military Forces?**

While peacekeeping was not in the UN Charter, this 'invention' by the world organisation has long been viewed as a legitimate deployment of outside military forces under UN command and control. Continual adaptations have characterised the evolution of peace operations, including, pertinently for our purposes, the evolution to more robust operations (on occasion, Chapter VII enforcement) and, more recently still, the inclusion of the

protection of cultural heritage as part of the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Thus far, this is the only such UN experiment, and that part of its mandate was eliminated after an initial two years. However, from the outset, NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) had, and continues to have, heritage protection in its mandate (Rosén 2017).

Rather than being peripheral and occasional, should heritage protection not become more central and routine? With numerous competing claims for limited resources, commanders in the field, as well as policy- and decision-makers in UN headquarters, often view such actions as distractions. The argument here is the opposite: the efforts to protect tangible heritage should be reframed as integral to protecting people and fostering peace processes. The value of heritage protection by an international peace force could be justified by attenuating the most obvious direct human costs of attacks on cultural heritage, which are borne by vulnerable populations: lost lives and livelihoods, forced displacement, reduced longevity, and misery. In terms of cultural heritage, protection by such a peace force could have a valuable preventive dimension. Curators and archivists, recognising the clear warning signals, have died while attempting to save tangible heritage in the face of violent attacks.

Heritage destruction sounds an alarm about forthcoming mass atrocities. The November 1938 Kristallnacht crimes of coordinated pogroms and cultural destruction by the Third Reich are perhaps the best-known example of the overture for subsequent human atrocities. However, there are far too many other instances across time and space. As indicated, Vladimir Putin's docket in The Hague is already lengthy, but the war crime of destroying cultural heritage is yet another reason to say 'nyet' to Russian recolonisation.

The brutal human costs are apparent and our point of departure, but conversations about tangible heritage loss should incorporate a full range of consequences in considering why it is worth protecting and why protection could be justified. First, destruction is ruinous for cultural identity and social cohesion. The buildings, museums, cemeteries, libraries, and infrastructure around which societies organise themselves help define a culture and people. Second, destruction of high-profile sites impedes post-crisis recovery; the negative impact on the economics of post-conflict financing is essential but often downplayed (del Castillo 2017). With the loss of tourist attractions comes the concomitant loss of investment opportunities, as well as the loss of employment related to care and upkeep, and revenue derived from tourism. Third, the destruction of heritage deepens a society's wounds and intensifies lingering animosities and the accounts eventually to be settled.

Destroying cultural heritage complicates reconciliation and unravels the safety net of resilience supporting strife-torn communities. A related concern is the intimate connection between cultural heritage and religious persecution. Again, examples abound. By their own admission, Iranian clerics are intent on destroying and eradicating every aspect of the Baha'i community, the largest religious minority in Iran and the only one whose faith is not recognised in the constitution. This illustration is especially pertinent for underlying the link between the use of religious persecution—against those who are called 'Islamic apostates'—to violate fundamental human rights (Amnesty International 2022; OHCHR 2022). With this reality in mind, for instance, the 1995 Dayton Accords addressed specifically the reconstruction of lost heritage as an essential component of peace, a necessary prelude to and prerequisite for peacebuilding in the former Yugoslavia. That insight was crucial; the impact was significant. The inclusion of cultural heritage protection in NATO's follow-up to the subsequent Kosovo War suggests the importance of that lesson.

The protection of cultural heritage as a routine task in mandates of an international peace force would encompass three tasks: removing hazards, suppressing looting, and deterring politically motivated attacks (Gowan 2022). The first is the technical task of removing such immediate hazards as land mines and unexploded ordnance near heritage sites. After initial dismal performances in Iraq and Afghanistan, NATO forces in Afghanistan helped around the Bamiyan Buddhas, as did MINUSMA in Mali. The latter also attempted to rectify some damage by launching short-term projects—so-called QIPs, or quick-impact projects—to foster the repair of libraries and religious sites around Timbuktu. MINUSMA also provided logistical support to experts from UNESCO, who were surveying damage and planning reconstruction.

The second broad task for an international peace force would be suppression of looting, a task that the Italian Carabinieri pioneered in 2003 in their area of operations while serving in the U.S.-led occupation force in Iraq (Russell 2008: 36). Through a mix of ground and helicopter patrols, the Italians disrupted looting at archaeological sites, an action largely absent from efforts by other coalition forces.

The third task for an international peace force draws on NATO efforts in Kosovo, which seek to deter and counter politically motivated attacks on cultural sites. In pursuing this protective task, KFOR initially set up static defence posts at prominent monasteries, shifting towards mobile patrols as a less militarily intensive approach when security conditions improved; eventually, Kosovo police assumed these responsibilities. Following over two decades of deployment, Frederik Rosén summarises that both tactically and strategically, ‘destabilising issues related to CP [cultural property] remain one of the top three reasons for NATO to sustain the mission’ (Rosén 2022: 3).

However unlikely, military intervention as an option for a UN force was a component of James Cuno’s five-point proposal to protect cultural heritage in Syria and Iraq, as well as to police borders to discourage trafficking in movable artefacts (Cuno 2016: 106). An international peace force would face many of the practical challenges of UN peacekeepers—namely, intelligence, resources, doctrines, and rules of engagement that shape and circumscribe activities, as well as the difficulty of sustaining complex operations for lengthy periods (Leloup 2019). Although difficult and politically fraught, none of these challenges is insurmountable, and they could arguably be more readily overcome for the less politically charged task of heritage protection. Fielding an international peace force is invariably political, but as Lopez-Claros, Dahl and Groff (2020) indicate, technical details matter.<sup>5</sup>

It would be essential for the members of such a force to contribute to longer-term efforts to protect heritage sites; tasks would include training the local military and police to assume direct protection, supporting preservation and reconstruction and helping improve the skills of heritage personnel. Training and technical projects are unlikely to succeed unless local political actors and populations buy into the overall need to protect heritage and own the effort.

How can tangible heritage protection be considered a distraction for external military personnel—often cavalierly dismissed as a ‘Christmas tree ornament’—within UN operational circles when they improve relations with the local community? Is this not valuable ‘mission creep’? If cultural heritage constitutes part of a ‘hybrid threat’, can it not also be a ‘hybrid benefit’? Rather than a bauble, could heritage protection produce a ‘virtuous circle and constitute a ‘force multiplier’? It is impossible to disentangle heritage protection from the broader reasons that justify the deployment of outside military personnel as peacekeepers or peace enforcers.

Beginning with the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), numerous UN documents looking to the future and gleaning lessons from the past prioritise that ‘politics must drive the design and implementation of peace operations’ (HIPPO 2015). Shortly before launching the 2018 ‘Action for Peacekeeping’ (A4P) initiative, for example, Secretary-General António Guterres noted that ‘peace operations are deployed in support of active diplomatic efforts, not as a substitute’ (UN 2017). As part of the need to ensure collective coherence in ‘political solutions’, negotiators should provide incentives and prioritise the essential need for tangible heritage protection because perhaps the most decisive factor in success is local buy-in. As such, it would make operational and ethical sense for future international military peace forces to incorporate the protection of tangible heritage as a routine component in standard operating procedures (SOPs)—indeed, as part of a relatively low-cost sales-pitch for outside assistance when parliaments are facing a budget request. Protecting tangible heritage helps win battles and wars, as well as works within occupations. The logic is not only ethical but strategic and tactical.

### Conclusion

The R2P’s core ethical framework is to halt mass murder and mass forced displacement, ongoing or intended. War-fighting and high-intensity military force will certainly remain the remit of the militaries of major powers; to state the obvious, they are not a comparative advantage of the United Nations. An international peace force in any foreseeable future also would not have the airlift, logistics, intelligence capabilities, or hardware to accomplish high-intensity enforcement.

It is problematic to intervene with military force in high-intensity war and violence when vital interests are not perceived to be at stake. Yet, the use of an independent and well-equipped peace force could be an alternative to protect cultural heritage when destruction is a prelude to, or accompanies, mass murder and the perpetrators are not major powers—which get a pass here as elsewhere. The effective protection of cultural heritage requires the kind of ‘robust’ deployments that have come to characterise some UN and hybrid peace operations but fall short of war-fighting. Such protection could provide a concrete and doable initial task for an independent peace force. The development and emergence of R2P reflected an altered political reality: suddenly, it was no longer taboo to discuss how best to halt mass atrocities. Although specific decisions about when and where to invoke R2P remain controversial, few observers question whether global responses to mass atrocities are justified. Instead, the debate is how best to achieve R2P’s lofty aims.

An essential component of mobilising political will is determining what will work and what will not. The argument here is that the protection of cultural heritage could help mobilise political will *and* work. If so, it could help attenuate what even a relative enthusiast like Adam Roberts (2008) summarises as ‘grounds for scepticism about proposals for UN standing forces, [but] the crises which such forces are intended to address are both serious and urgent’ (100). Hence, a specific task to launch an all-volunteer force of some 5 to 10,000 soldiers would be the protection of cultural heritage. This number would fall far short of the 200 to 600,000 discussed in the late 1950s, but it resembles the more realistic size proposed in the early years of the post-Cold War era by Brian Urquhart, among others (Stanley, Lee and von Pagenhardt 1992: ch. 2; Urquhart 1993).<sup>6</sup>

This volunteer force would be useful in contexts where the destroyers are not a serious military force—e.g., to counter the Taliban’s attack on the Bamiyan Buddhas and

arguably the Iranian attacks on Baha'is. But such a force would certainly not be able to thwart Chinese attacks in Xinjiang, or Russian ones in Ukraine or the U.S. lack of protection for Iraqi artefacts. Indeed, one of the more useful and feasible tasks would be during Andrew Herscher's (2010) 'afterwar', or when 'the violence of war did not so much end as shift its direction' (124). The smallish volunteer force would have the advantage of not requiring an amendment to the UN Charter—something of a fool's errand short of the complete collapse of the current world order. Nonetheless, such a force could not avoid state decision-making to approve a deployment, not only for annual budgetary reasons but also for backup. It would not exclude the need for logistic support and reinforcements, in the direst of circumstances, from national forces. Planning on best-case outcomes and searching to finesse state approval is a gimmick that is dangerous and could backfire. Backup would be required for an initial deployment, as well as coming to the rescue, should worst-case scenarios take place and the survival of the independent force be threatened.

The idea of any type of standing UN force has virtually disappeared in recent years, so why propose mandating an international peace force to start with the protection of cultural heritage? Because the specific task is feasible and because the protection of tangible cultural heritage is not a distraction for proponents of the robust protection of people, an emerging norm that should be reinforced.

To repeat, the intersection between violent attacks on humans and their heritage means that there is no need to add another crime to the four mass atrocities agreed by the 2005 World Summit. Rather, protecting cultural heritage is a fundamental aspect of protecting people from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. In addition, emphasising such protection within the R2P framework has the potential to widen support for that norm and its place in customary law, as well as contribute to ongoing conversations about the characteristics of legitimate sovereignty. Responsible states view mass atrocities as a matter of international and not merely domestic jurisdiction; the destruction of immovable cultural heritage should be viewed similarly because of its universal value and the intimate links between attacks on cultural objects, structures and monuments, on the one hand, and attacks on vulnerable populations, on the other hand.

Destroying cultural heritage is not new, but neither is the impulse to protect and preserve it. Thus, it is worth reiterating that the convergence of two factors has altered the possibilities for the politics of protection and the feasibility of international action, including an international peace force. The first is that the destruction of cultural heritage has riveted the attention not only of cultural specialists but also of pundits, the public and politicians. The second factor is that the destruction of tangible cultural heritage has become widely associated with terrorism, and its protection thus benefits from this high-priority link to international security. While not wishing to downplay the possible abuses of securitisation (e.g., tarring all dissidents as 'terrorists'), nonetheless, public resources to protect cultural heritage can be mobilised under the rubric of national security. If so, Charles Dickens's description of the French Revolution in *A Tale of Two Cities* could apply to contemporary world politics: 'It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness'.

Generalisations are limited about what Finkelstein, Gilman and Rosén (2022) have called the 'heritage-security nexus' because the range of destructive perpetrators is so mind-boggling. The specific conscience-shocking attacks in the contemporary era<sup>7</sup> on peoples and their heritage vary across a wide spectrum of actors and crimes: by major

powers (China against the Uyghur communities in Xinjiang), by vengeful or rogue states (the governments of Sri Lanka and Afghanistan against ethnic minority communities in the northeast of Sri Lanka and in the Bamiyan Valley), by outside allies abetting repressive governments (Russia and the Assad regime in Palmyra and Aleppo, Saudi Arabia in Yemen), by non-state terrorists (Islamist militants in Timbuktu); by clerical intransigents in Iran (against the Baha'is), and by successive governments in a small state (against the indigenous Maya of Guatemala).

What remains of our ancient heritage is already suffering from wanton destruction, looting, neglect, reckless overdevelopment, and climate change. Now we face the likes of Vladimir Putin. Despite foot-dragging in parts of the Global South, the surprising solidarity that has emerged to confront Russian aggression and heritage destruction may be a harbinger of a wider change in international political culture. Let us hope so. It is time to begin a longer-term project of constructing an international regime to protect cultural heritage and the peoples who identify with and benefit from it. This could be a substantial part of a foundation for a better global governance mechanism for international peace and security.

It is worth repeating the necessity *not* to split hairs between protecting people and the cultural heritage that sustains them. All people share a common human heritage—intricate, complex and reflective of diverse cultures. This chapter draws attention to the plight of endangered populations and revives the case for the protection of tangible cultural heritage. The staffs from the Middle East Institute, the Asia Society and the Antiquities Coalition (2016) evaluated the region's devastation: 'The fight to protect the peoples of the region and their heritage cannot be separated'.

One political observation is in order by way of conclusion. Ironically, Putin's brutal invasion has backfired in numerous ways. Many have commented that the menace of NATO and the European Union and Western ties to Ukraine were a purported justification for the war, but the impact has been the opposite—namely, to strengthen Western solidarity. In a similar cultural irony, some Ukrainians are trying to erase Russia—and the Russian language—from their culture and landscape. In Ukraine's public squares and parks, 'de-Russification' is visible as statues of Russian poets and Soviet generals are being torn down or defaced, and public art and propaganda murals are being covered up or removed.

Hugo Slim (2012) provides an apt metaphor: 'Like oil and vinegar, ideals and reality never fully dissolve into one another and tend naturally to separate if left alone. To combine, they need to be regularly stirred up together if they are to make a good vinaigrette'. That culinary-cum-political advice applies to proponents of global governance who need to fuse idealism and realism in a 'vinaigrette global agenda'. Seeking a more ethical future without taking adequately into account power and interests is foolish, but power and interests are blind without an ethical foundation and a vision of a more desirable world.

Thus, it is essential to do the right thing even if it is less effective than I argue. As Scott Sagan (2022) reminds us, '[W]e should follow the law because it reflects who we are, or at least who we aspire to be' (496). Protecting humans and tangible heritage is an apt illustration.

## Notes

- 1 She first used the term in December 2014 in UNESCO, *Heritage and Cultural Diversity at Risk in Iraq and Syria* (Paris: UNESCO, 2014), [www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CLT/CLT/pdf/IraqSyriaReport-en.pdf](http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CLT/CLT/pdf/IraqSyriaReport-en.pdf).
- 2 For up-to-date tallies, see the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (2023).

- 3 For a discussion, see Waller (2016); Sands (2016: 160–01).
- 4 Patty Gerstenblith, Benjamin Charlier, Tural Mustafayev, Marc-André Renold, Allesandro Chechi, Francesco Francioni, Joseph Powderly, Savine von Schormerler, Philippe Sands and Ashrutha Rai, in Cuno and Weiss (2022: 367–478).
- 5 They overstate their case that it is ‘a matter of primarily technical, not political concern’ (Lopez-Claros, Dahl and Groff 2020: 180).
- 6 At about the same time, several governments (Netherlands, Canada and Denmark) tabled related proposals.
- 7 Successive centuries of attacks by colonial powers and settlers—motivated, for example, by the ‘Doctrine of Discovery’ against the indigenous populations of North and South America—are not the focus of this chapter.

## Bibliography

- Amnesty International. 2022. ‘Iran: Stop Ruthless Attacks on Persecuted Baha’i Religious Minority’, 24 August, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/08/iran-stop-ruthless-attacks-on-persecuted-bahai-religious-minority/> (accessed on 11 January 2023).
- Ki-Moon Ban. 2009. ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, Report of the Secretary-General’, 12 January, <https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/report-of-the-secretary-general-implementing-the-responsibility-to-protect/> (accessed on 11 January 2023).
- Bass, Gary. 2008. *Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Bellamy, Alex J. 2009. *Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Bevan, Robert. 2022. *Monumental Lies: Culture Wars and the Truth about the Past*. London: Verso.
- Bokova, Irina. 2014. ‘Heritage and Cultural Diversity at Risk in Iraq and Syria’, <https://openarchive.icomos.org/id/eprint/1551/1/232562f.pdf> (accessed on 11 January 2023).
- Commission on Global Governance. 1995. *Our Global Neighbourhood*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cuno, James. 2016. ‘The Responsibility to Protect the World’s Cultural Heritage’, *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 23(1): 97–109.
- Cuno, James. 2022. ‘Getty Condemns the Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Ukraine’, 28 February, <https://www.getty.edu/news/getty-condemns-the-destruction-of-cultural-heritage-in-ukraine/> (accessed on 11 January 2023).
- Cuno, James and Thomas G. Weiss (eds). 2022. *Cultural Heritage and Mass Atrocities*. Los Angeles: J. Paul Getty Trust.
- del Castillo, Graciana. 2017. *Obstacles to Peacebuilding*. London: Routledge.
- Eakin, Hugh. 2015. ‘Use Force to Stop ISIS’ Destruction of Art and History’, *The New York Times*, 3 April.
- Evans, Gareth. 2008. *The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes once and for All*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Finkelstein, Claire, Derek Gilman and Frederik Rosén (eds). 2022. *The Preservation of Art and Culture in Times of War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. 2023. ‘UN Security Council Resolutions and Presidential Statements Referencing R2P’, <https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/un-security-council-resolutions-and-presidential-statements-referencing-r2p/> (accessed 24 June 2023).
- Global Policy Forum. June 2007. ‘Destruction of Cultural Heritage’, <https://archive.globalpolicy.org/humanitarian-issues-in-iraq/consequences-of-the-war-and-occupation-of-iraq/35721.html#:~:text=The%20United%20States%20and%20its%20allies%20ignored%20the,National%20Library%20and%20looters%20pillaged%20the%20National%20Museum> (accessed on 11 January 2023).
- Gowan, Richard. 2022. ‘Peace Operations and the Protection of Cultural Heritage’, in James and Thomas G. Weiss (eds), *Cultural Heritage and Mass Atrocities*, pp. 534–47. Los Angeles: J. Paul Getty Trust.

- Haberman, Maggie. 2020. 'Trump Threatens Iranian Cultural Sites, and Warns of Sanctions on Iraq', *The New York Times*, 5 January.
- Hehir, Aidan. 2012. *The Responsibility to Protect: Rhetoric, Reality, and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Herscher, Andrew. 2010. *Violence Taking Place: The Architecture of the Kosovo Conflict*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
- High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO). 2015. 'Uniting Our Strengths for Peace—Politics, Partnership and People', [https://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/HIPPO\\_Report\\_1\\_June\\_2015.pdf](https://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf) (accessed on 11 January 2023).
- International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). 2001. *The Responsibility to Protect*. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre.
- Khurshudyan, Isabelle, Joyce Sohyun Lee and Miriam Berger. 2022. 'Ukrainian President Says Russian Missile Hit Site of Babyn Yar Holocaust Memorial', *The Washington Post*, 1 March.
- Leloup, Mathilde. 2019. 'Heritage Protection as Stabilisation, the Emergence of a New 'Mandated Task' for UN Peace Operations', *International Peacekeeping*, 26(4): 408–30.
- Lemkin, Raphael. 1933. 'Acts Constituting a General (Transnational) Danger Considered as Offences Against the Law of Nations', <http://www.preventgenocide.org/lemkin/madrid1933-english.htm> (accessed on 11 January 2023).
- Lemkin, Raphael. 1944. *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, and Proposals for Redress*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment.
- Lopez-Claros, Augusto, Arthur L. Dahl and Maja Groff. 2020. *Global Governance and the Emergence of Global Institutions for the 21st Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Luck, Edward C. 2011. 'The Responsibility to Protect: The First Decade', *Global Responsibility to Protect*, 3(4): 387–99.
- Luck, Edward C. 2018. 'Cultural Genocide and the Protection of Cultural Heritage', in *Occasional Papers in Cultural Heritage Policy*, vol. 2. Los Angeles: J. Paul Getty Trust. <https://www.amazon.ca/-/fr/Edward-C-Luck-ebook/dp/B08M9CJXKM>
- Middle East Institute, Asia Society, and the Antiquities Coalition. April 2016. 'Culture under Threat: Recommendations for the U.S. Government', [http://www.academia.edu/30873427/Culture\\_Under\\_Threat\\_Recommendations\\_for\\_the\\_U\\_S\\_Government](http://www.academia.edu/30873427/Culture_Under_Threat_Recommendations_for_the_U_S_Government) (accessed on 11 January 2023).
- Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR). 2022. 'Iran: UN Experts Alarmed by Escalating Religious Persecution', August 22, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/08/iran-un-experts-alarmed-escalating-religious-persecution> (accessed on 11 January 2023).
- Orford, Anne. 2011. *International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Roberts, Adam. 2008. 'Proposals for UN Standing Forces: A Critical History,' in Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, and Dominik Zaum (eds), *The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945*, pp. 99–130. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rosén, Frederik. 2017. *NATO and Cultural Property: Embracing New Challenges In the Era of Identity Wars*. Copenhagen: Nordic Center for Cultural Heritage & Armed Conflict.
- Rosén, Frederik. 2022. *NATO and Cultural Property: A Hybrid Threat Perspective*. Copenhagen: Nordic Center for Cultural Heritage and Armed Conflict.
- Russell, John M. 2008. 'Efforts to Protect Archaeological Sites and Monuments in Iraq, 2003–2004,' in Geoff Emberling and Katharyn Hanson (eds), *Catastrophe! The Looting and Destruction of Iraq's Past*, pp. 29–43. Chicago: The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago.
- Sagan, Scott D. 2022. 'From Kyoto to Baghdad to Terran: Leadership, Law, and the Protection of Cultural Heritage', in James and Thomas G. Weiss (eds), *Cultural Heritage and Mass Atrocities*, pp. 485–99. Los Angeles: J. Paul Getty Trust.
- Sands, Philippe. 2016. *East West Street*, pp.160–61. New York: Vintage Books.



- Sands, Philippe and Ashrutha Rais. 2022. 'After the Dust Settles: Transitional Justice in the Aftermath of Cultural Crimes', in James and Thomas G. Weiss (eds), *Cultural Heritage and Mass Atrocities*, pp. 353–66. Los Angeles: J. Paul Getty Trust.
- Slim, Hugo. 2012. 'Idealism and Realism in Humanitarian Action,' in Hugo Slim (ed), *Essays in Humanitarian Action*. Oxford: Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law, and Armed Conflict, University of Oxford.
- Stanley, Timothy, John M. Lee and Robert Von Pagenhardt. 1992. *To Unite Our Strength: Enhancing the United Nations Peace and Security System*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
- Stevens, Matt. 2022. 'Officers Train to Protect Art Amid Wars'. *The New York Times*, 12 August.
- Stimson Center. 2021. *Beyond UN75: A Roadmap for Inclusive, Networked & Effective Global Governance*. Washington, DC: Stimson Center.
- Tetlock, Philip E. and Aaron Belkin (eds). 1996. *Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Thakur, Ramesh. 2017. *The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect* (2nd ed). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- United Nations. 2005. '2005 World Summit Outcome', General Assembly resolution 60/1, paragraphs 138–140.
- United Nations. 2017. 'Peace Operations "Not a Substitute" for Diplomatic Efforts, Security Council Told', *UN News*, 20 September, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/09/565672-peace-operations-not-substitute-diplomatic-efforts-security-council-told> (accessed on 11 January 2023).
- UNESCO. 1972. 'Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage', November 16, <http://whc.unesco.org/en/conventiontext/> (accessed on 17 May 2023).
- UNESCO. 2014. 'Heritage and Cultural Diversity at Risk in Iraq and Syria', [www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CLT/CLT/pdf/IraqSyriaReport-en.pdf](http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CLT/CLT/pdf/IraqSyriaReport-en.pdf) (accessed on 11 January 2023).
- UNESCO. 2023. 'Damaged Cultural Sites in Ukraine Verified by UNESCO', <https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/damaged-cultural-sites-ukraine-verified-unesco> (accessed on 1 February 2023).
- Urquhart, Brian. 1993. 'For a UN Volunteer Force', *New York Review of Books*, 10 June.
- Waller, James. 2016. *Confronting Evil: Engaging Our Responsibility to Prevent Genocide*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Weiss, Thomas G. 2013. 'The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Modern Diplomacy,' in Andrew Cooper, Jorge Heine, and Ramesh Thakur (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, pp. 763–78. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Weiss, Thomas G. 2016. *Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action* (3rd ed). Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Weiss, Thomas G. 2022. 'Moving beyond R2P: Protecting Heritage and Humans', in *Items: Insights from the Social Sciences* (from the Social Sciences Research Council, <https://items.ssrc.org/where-heritage-meets-violence/moving-beyond-r2p/>) (accessed on 11 January 2023).
- Weiss, Thomas G. 2023. 'Protecting Heritage and Humans: Weighing Politics and Law,' in Giuliana Ziccardi Capaldo (ed), *Global Community Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Weiss, Thomas G. and Don Hubert (eds). 2001. *The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background*. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre.
- Weiss, Thomas G. and Ramesh Thakur. 2010. *Global Governance and the UN: An Unfinished Journey*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.